Hi TCPAWorld!
I got some news for you that might just blow your socks off.
On September 24, 2026, Congress introduced the “Stop Spam Calls Act” and its whole purpose is to direct the FCC to change the definition of “prior express written consent”.
The 47 CFR § 64.1200(f)(9) currently defines “prior express written consent” as:
“an agreement, in writing, bearing the signature of the person called that clearly authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the person called advertisements or telemarketing messages using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, and the telephone number to which the signatory authorizes such advertisements or telemarketing messages to be delivered.”
It seems that Congress is not satisfied with that definition. Hence, the bill mandating the FCC to revise the definition.
The FCC is being mandated to revise the definition to include that prior express written consent under the TCPA must be to one seller at a time and that the seller must be logically and topically related to the content of the website on which consent is obtained.
And if robotext/robocalls are involved, there needs to be a “clear and conspicuous” disclosure before the consumer is considered to have consented.
So for the lead generation industry, things could get a little more complicated.
The consumer not only has to provide one-to-one consent, but the seller has to relate to what the consumer was seeking. For example, if a consumer is on a website seeking mortgage quotes and submits a request for more information, a car dealership cannot use that submission form to justify their calls or texts because they are not logically and typically related to what the consumer was seeking (mortgage quotes).
But does the FCC revising the definition really matter? Here is where things get interesting.
Earlier this year, in Bradford v. Sovereign Pest Control of TX, Inc., No. 24-20379, 2026 WL 520620 (5th Cir. Feb. 25, 2026), the Court held that the TCPA does not require prior express written consent and that oral consent will do just fine. It looked at the plain meaning of the statutory text and noted that the TCPA makes it unlawful to make prerecorded calls to cell phones absent “the prior express consent of the called party.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(A)(iii). Notice that the word “written” is not there. The court concluded that Congress’s use of “express consent” already encompassed both oral and written consent meaning there was no gap for the FCC to fill.
So while Congress is trying to revive a more restrictive definition of “prior express written consent”, the Fifth Circuit has questioned the requirement of consent needing to be written under TCPA at all.
And this is what makes the Stop Spam Calls Act significant. The Bill seems to be attempting to supply the very authority that the Fifth Circuit found missing in Bradford.
If enacted, the FCC has one year to revise the definition, and the Bill would take effect 18 months after enactment. But the proposal is still in the early stages so we shall keep you updated!