BETTER LATE THAN NEVER?: Ohio District Court Grants Motion For Reconsideration Six Years After Facebook v. Duguid.

Hi, TCPAWorld! Kelly Sandberg here, with some case law revival, six years after the significant ruling in Facebook v. Duguid emerged.

In Phillip Ramsey v. Receivables Performance Management, LLC, Plaintiff Ramsey had previously brought an action in 2016 against Receivables Performance Management, LLC and Howard George (collectively “Defendants”) for violations of the TCPA by using automated technology to call Plaintiff’s cellphone 245 times without his consent. Phillip Ramsey v. Receivables Performance Management, LLC, No. 1:16-CV-1059, 2026 WL 2916680, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2026).

In 2019, both parties had filed motions for summary judgment and the then-assigned District Judge, Matthew W. McFarland, denied summary judgment to the Defendants and granted Plaintiff partial summary judgment in 2020. Plaintiff was also awarded $122,500.00 for TCPA violations.

However, not long after this ruling was made, the Supreme Court decided Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 592 U.S. 395 (2021). And just now, almost six years after that ruling, Defendants requested that the Court reconsider the previous decision in light of Duguid.

“District courts have authority both under common law and Rule 54(b) to reconsider interlocutory orders and to reopen any part of a case before entry of final judgment.” Rodriguez v. Tenn Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 F. App’x 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004). Reconsideration may be appropriate under this rule “when there is (1) an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Id.

The Court determined that reconsideration was appropriate here because Duguid resolved a conflict among the Courts of Appeals that was at issue when the Judge McFarland denied summary judgment to the Defendants.

Judge McFarland had expressly relied on Allan v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, when making his determination, but after he did so, Duguid resolved the issue of what is considered to be an automatic telephone dialing system, or an auto dialer under the TCPA. Allan v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 968 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2020).

In case you’re new around here, Duguid provided that “a necessary feature of an auto dialer under §227(a)(1)(A) is the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator to either store or produce phone numbers to be called.” Duguid, 592 U.S. at 409 (emphasis added). Because of this determination, the Supreme Court had expressly vacated and abrogated the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Allan.

In applying Duguid, rather than Allen, the Court determined whether the dialer used by Defendants would qualify as an automatic telephone dialing system, and whether summary judgment was warranted for Defendants.

Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Plaintiff Ramsey contended that the dialer Defendants used qualified as an ATDS, and that this argument was reinforced by a case that predated Duguid. Besides this contention, Plaintiff offered no additional support that would create a genuine issue of material fact to warrant summary judgment in his favor.

The Court agreed with Defendants’ argument that summary judgment could not be granted when Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that Defendants used a random or sequential number generator.

Additionally, Defendants had provided affirmative evidence that they did not have a random or sequential number generator, as shown in the facts that Judge McFarland had initially relied upon.

The facts supported the conclusion that the dialer did not store or produce phone numbers to be called. That evidence established that Defendant’s electronic database system: (1) maintained telephone numbers as part of identified debtors’ account records; (2) selected accounts for next-day calling based on entered dialing parameters; and (3) that system compiled the selected accounts into “campaigns” (pre-existing lists of telephone numbers) before transferring the campaigns to a Noble Systems, Inc. telephone system – also known as the Noble Predictive Dialer. The Noble Predictive Dialer would then dial campaign numbers by clicking a button to press play to have a list start.

The Court determined that the dialer used was an automated dialer that chose from a targeted, predetermined list – NOT an ATDS system. No storing, and no producing here! (Sorry – six years ago!)

Ultimately, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for reconsideration, vacated the prior Memorandum Opinion and Order by Judge McFarland, and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Better late than never…I guess?