After a wave of decisions holding that text messages qualify as “telephone calls” under the TCPA, we now have two of the four federal districts in Texas reaching the opposite conclusion: text messages are not “telephone calls” under § 227(c)(5)! And with no Fifth Circuit decision resolving the issue, this split is certainly one worth watching.
You may recall that just last week, the Southern District of Texas became the first federal district in Texas to hold that text messages do not qualify as telephone calls for purposes of the TCPA’s DNC provisions in Siringi v. Crust Pizza. Well, now the Northern District of Texas has joined the party!
In Starling v. What If Holdings LLC, 2026 WL 3536298 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2026) the Northern District of Texas granted the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, finding that the Plaintiff could not maintain either of her TCPA claims based solely on the receipt of unwanted text messages. Specifically, the Court held that text messages do not qualify as “telephone calls” under § 227(c)(5) and separately dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim based on the FCC’s caller-identification regulation.
The case involved a putative class action in which the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant sent at least 24 unsolicited telemarketing text messages to her number, which was registered on the National DNC Registry. In addition to alleging violations of the TCPA’s DNC provisions, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant failed to provide the caller-identification information required by § 64.1601(e)(1). The Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that text messages do not qualify as “telephone calls” under § 227(c)(5). As to the caller-identification claim, the Defendant separately argued that the regulation was promulgated under § 227(d), which does not provide a private right of action.
1. First Cause of Action
The Court first addressed the Plaintiff’s claim under § 227(c)(5). The question was whether text messages qualify as “telephone calls” under the statute. To answer it, the Court turned to traditional principles of statutory interpretation.
The Ordinary Public Meaning of a Telephone Call
First, the Court looked at the ordinary public meaning of “telephone call” at the time the TCPA was enacted. The parties relied on different dictionary definitions. The Defendant focused on the word “telephone,” which included a sonic element, while the Plaintiff relied on a definition of “call” as communication by telephone, arguing that text messages also fall within that meaning.
The Court rejected the Plaintiff’s interpretation, explaining that it could not ignore the word “telephone” modifying “call.” Ultimately, the Court determined that, whether in 1991 or today, the ordinary public usage of “telephone call” is not synonymous with, nor does it encompass, a “text message.” As the Court explained, a person asking for a “telephone call” would not expect to receive a written message or text.
Surrounding Statutory Text
Next, the Court looked at the surrounding statutory language and found further support for its interpretation. The Court noted that in 2018 and 2019 Congress amended other provisions of the TCPA to expressly include text messages. However, Congress did not include similar language in § 227(c)(5). The Court therefore could not conclude that Congress intended to extend § 227(c)(5)’s private right of action to text messages when it expressly included them in other provisions but omitted them from this one.
The Court also pointed out that Congress used the broader term “telephone solicitation” in other subsections of § 227(c). That term is defined to include the initiation of a “telephone call or message.” Section 227(c)(5), however, does not use “telephone solicitation”. Instead, it specifically limits the private right of action to “telephone calls.” The Court found that to be further evidence that Congress did not intend to include text messages.
The Plaintiff also argued that courts interpreting § 227(b) have treated text messages as telephone calls, and that the same meaning should apply under § 227(c). She relied primarily on Warciak v. Subway Restaurants, Inc. and Howard v. Republican National Committee. The Court found neither of these cases persuasive. It explained that Warciak relied on language from another case where the parties had not disputed whether text messages qualified as calls under § 227(b), so the Supreme Court never actually analyzed the issue. The Court also noted that Howard relied on earlier Ninth Circuit precedent that had deferred to the FCC’s interpretation under Chevron. The Court was not convinced that either case had actually analyzed the statutory language closely enough to support their conclusion.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the consistent meaning of “telephone call” throughout the TCPA does not include text messages. Based on the ordinary meaning of the phrase, the surrounding statutory text, and the lack of persuasive authority to the contrary, the Court held that § 227(c)(5) allows claims based on unwanted telephone calls, but not unwanted text messages.
Agency Interpretation
Finally, the Plaintiff also argued that the Court should follow the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA, which treats text messages as telephone calls. The Court, however, relied on Loper Bright and rejected that argument.
Cases to the Contrary Are Unpersuasive
Before reaching its conclusion, the Court also addressed the decisions that had reached the opposite result. It noted that neither the Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit has addressed whether text messages are “telephone calls” under § 227(c). Although the Court acknowledged the growing split among district courts, it was not persuaded by the decisions reaching the opposite conclusion. It explained that many of those courts found text messages to be telephone calls simply because other district courts had reached the same conclusion, without independently analyzing the statutory language. And even in one of the few cases that considered ordinary meaning, the court relied on a broad definition of “call” from a dictionary published in 2002, more than a decade after the TCPA was enacted.
And honestly, this was my favorite part of the ruling and, in my opinion, one of its most important takeaways. Yes, precedent matters. But courts cannot simply follow what everyone else is doing without independently considering whether the reasoning is actually correct. Otherwise, where does that leave us? Does the first court to decide an issue get to dictate the outcome forever, regardless of whether its analysis holds up? Courts have to do the work of interpreting the statutory language for themselves. And when they do, I think the distinction here is pretty hard to ignore. A telephone call is just simply not the same thing as a text message.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that because the Plaintiff’s claim was based entirely on the receipt of text messages, she could not maintain a cause of action under the TCPA’s DNC provisions. The Court therefore dismissed the Plaintiff’s first cause of action.
2. Second Cause of Action
The Plaintiff’s second claim was based on the FCC’s caller-identification regulation under § 64.1601(e)(1), which requires telemarketers to transmit caller-identification information. The Defendant argued that the regulation was promulgated under § 227(d), which does not provide a private right of action. The Plaintiff countered that it was promulgated under § 227(c), which does.
The Court ultimately declined to decide which subsection authorized the regulation because the Plaintiff’s claim failed either way. If the regulation was promulgated under § 227(d), there was no private right of action. And if it was promulgated under § 227(c), the Plaintiff still could not recover because she alleged receiving only text messages, not telephone calls. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the second cause of action as well.
Ultimately, the Court dismissed both of the Plaintiff’s causes of action without prejudice and granted her leave to amend by December 1, 2026, to allege facts beyond the receipt of unwanted text messages. Now we’ll have to wait and see whether the Plaintiff amends her Complaint and what, if anything, she comes back with.
As always, stay tuned for the latest news on TCPA!
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